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INTRODUCTION 
Expectations of future returns from vocational activity underlie the choice of employment 
and trigger the decision to start a venture (Cassar, 2006; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). 
Individuals, when choosing to invest their time and capital in nascent entrepreneurial activity, do 
so with an expectation of success, such as the probability of achieving an operating business. 
Expectations also underlie the subsequent actions of individuals through the venturing process, 
such as whether to continue in self-employment or how much additional time and capital to 
invest (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997; McCarthy, Schoorman, & Cooper, 1993). Given 
the importance of expectations on individual behavior, there are consequences for individuals, 
their stakeholders, and the economy, to making inaccurate or systematically biased predictions 
related to entrepreneurial choices. 
The rationality of nascent entrepreneurial expectations, that predictions of future 
outcomes related to venturing activity are made without bias, is often assumed when modeling 
entry into self-employment and organizational creation (Evans & Jovanovic, 1989; Evans & 
Leighton, 1989). However, researchers acknowledge that individuals are bounded and open to 
potential influences that may lead them to have biased expectations (Kahneman & Lovallo, 
1993; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Simon 1955). For example, there is substantial evidence that 
individuals are overly optimistic, in that they overestimate the probability of favorable outcomes 
(Weinstein, 1980).1 The tendency of nascent and existing entrepreneurs to have over-optimistic 
expectations may explain why individuals enter and persist in self-employment even in the 
presence of lower returns from venturing (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Moskowitz & Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2002). While there are conjectures as to the nature of expectations of those entering 
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or continuing in self-employment, surprisingly, there is little evidence on the rationality of 
entrepreneurial expectations. Simply put, there is no research that has investigated how ex-ante 
expectations of individuals entering self-employment, namely nascent entrepreneurs, map into 
actual ex-post realizations such as the creation of an operating business, achieved sales growth, 
or returns from self-employment. Consequently, our understanding of the nature of 
entrepreneurial expectations and entrepreneurial entry is incomplete. 
I address this important gap by longitudinally examining the rationality of the 
expectations of nascent entrepreneurs, namely those individuals who are currently involved in 
the process of starting a business, using data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics 
(PSED). The distinctive feature of the PSED is that it identifies and surveys nascent 
entrepreneurs while in the process of starting new ventures, thereby overcoming potential 
survivorship and recall biases associated with surveying entrepreneurs already in business 
(Gartner, Shaver, Carter, & Reynolds, 2004). Further, the PSED longitudinally surveys nascent 
entrepreneurs throughout the startup process, allowing for the comparison of ex-ante 
expectations with ex-post realizations, and thereby overcoming the use of perceptual measures of 
predictions or outcomes.  
To understand potential causes for nascent entrepreneurial over-optimism, I examine the 
influence of information acquisition and use by the entrepreneur on cross-sectional differences in 
over-optimism. Individuals undertaking nascent venture activity provide a powerful sample for 
an investigation of over-optimism given the high uncertainty of the forecasting task and the 
increased likelihood that entrepreneurs will exhibit greater cognitive bias than the general 
population (Baron, 2004; Busenitz & Barney, 1997). While, generally, more information is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 Consistent with observed over-optimism, some recent theoretical economic models have explicit 
modeling of optimistic or overconfident individuals into self-employment (Bernardo and Welch 2001; Brocas and 
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considered to be beneficial when formulating expectations (Durand, 2003; Forbes, 2005; Simon, 
Houghton, & Aquino, 1999), several authors suggest that information acquisition and use may in 
fact be ineffective in dampening, or may potentially exacerbate, the optimistic tendencies of 
individuals (Armor & Taylor, 1997; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001). 
In this paper, I argue that over-optimism in nascent entrepreneurs is exacerbated by the adoption 
of an “inside view” to forecasting. Individuals form an inside view forecast by focusing on the 
specifics of the case, the details of the plan that exists, and obstacles to its completion, and by 
constructing scenarios of future progress (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993: 25-26). Researchers have 
shown that individuals generally adopt an inside view to generate forecasts (Buehler, Griffin, & 
Ross, 1994). The inside view is synonymous with the planning fallacy, which focuses the 
attention of decision makers on the specifics of the problem rather than on the outcomes of 
similar cases or “base rate” information (Baron, 1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Consequently, the planning fallacy, realized through the inside view, is argued to cause the 
tendency for individuals to hold confident beliefs in the success of their own projects, even when 
knowing other individuals have failed in similar projects. 
I find significant over-optimism in the expectations of nascent entrepreneurs, in that they 
overestimate the probability that their nascent activities will successfully lead to an operating 
business. Further, of those nascent entrepreneurs who do achieve an operating venture, I observe 
that they overestimate both the future sales and number of employees in the first year of 
operation. These results are consistent with optimistic entry of individuals into self-employment. 
Cross-sectionally, I find that formal business planning is associated with more optimistic beliefs 
about future venture operation; however, these beliefs appear justified in that formal business 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Carrillo 2004). 
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planning also increases the likelihood of venture operation. Consistent with the inside view 
causing over-optimism in expectations, I find that the preparation of projected financial 
statements leads to overly-optimistic sales forecasts for the venture. Overall, this study 
documents that nascent entrepreneurs exhibit substantial over-optimism in their expectations and 
that over-optimism is influenced by the use of information. 
The study findings contribute to theory and practice in several ways. First, it is the first 
study to provide longitudinal evidence of the rationality of individuals’ expectations during the 
venture evaluation process. As such, it contributes to the literature that seeks to understand the 
forces that underlie entry and persistence of entrepreneurial behavior, and consequently, 
organization creation. Second, this study contributes to understanding cross-sectional differences 
in forecast over-optimism as the first study to investigate how the inside view can affect 
expectations in a field setting. While the inside view has been conjectured to be associated with 
over-optimism, there is limited extant theory testing of this within a field sample. The surveying 
of individuals undertaking start-up activity overcomes concerns from experimental data, which 
may overstate the role of decision making biases in the field (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Simon 
& Houghton, 2003). Third, this study contributes to management practice by providing a link 
between management practices and observed psychological bias. Understanding what influences 
forecasting bias is vital for all decision makers, as expectations underlie future actions and 
behavior. Documenting a relationship between commonly used management practices and 
optimistic prediction is particularly important, given the fundamental role that financial 
projections play in allowing decision makers to structure expectations and cope with the future, 
and because academics and stakeholders generally encourage the use of formal planning and 
financial projections. The evidence from this study suggests that the same management activities 
  
6 
that are relied upon and encouraged to be adopted to cope with uncertainty are associated with 
overly-optimistic expectations. 
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Over-Optimism 
While rationality of entrepreneurial expectations is often assumed in economic models of 
entry into venturing, researchers acknowledge that individuals are bounded and open to potential 
influences that may lead to them to have biased expectations (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). There is substantial evidence in many domains that individuals are 
optimistic (Weinstein, 1980). This evidence shows not only that individuals perceive that 
favorable events are more likely to happen, but also that favorable events are more likely to 
happen to them rather than their peers (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Similarly, individuals generally 
exhibit overconfidence, in that they overestimate their ability to do well (Larwood & Whittaker, 
1977). Such overconfidence can be in regard to an individual’s knowledge, ability to predict the 
future, or general personal abilities (Hayward, Shepherd & Griffin 2006: 162; Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999; Simon & Houghton, 2003).  
The presence of optimism about exogenous events and excessive self-confidence results 
in decision makers generally having overly optimistic expectations, in that their expectations of 
the outcomes regarding their chosen actions exhibit a positive ex-ante bias (Gervais, Heaton & 
Odean, 2005; Heaton, 2002; Malmendier & Tate, 2005a).2 In other words, decision makers’ 
                                                          
2 Some authors refer to overconfidence to describe the overestimation of expected returns, such as personal 
wealth, from their decisions (Hayward et al., 2006: 161; Malmendier & Tate, 2005b: 651). Kahneman & Tversky 
(1995: 46) use the term optimistic overconfidence to describe an individual’s overestimation of success and their 
certainty to ensure success. I adopt the term over-optimism from the forecasting literature, which describes the 
properties of the forecast investigated that is argued to be an outcome of the decision making process (Cassar & 
Gibson, 2007; Sedor, 2002). 
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expectations of future outcomes are more favorable than what eventually occurs. Further, over-
optimism tends to be exacerbated when tasks are perceived to be controllable and therefore is 
likely to be heightened if expectations are based upon planned activity (Weinstein, 1980). In this 
study’s setting, individuals are considered to be overly optimistic when they overestimate the 
likelihood that their nascent activity will result in an operating venture or when they overestimate 
the future sales and employment of their new ventures.  
However, the presence of over-optimistic beliefs in those that enter nascent 
entrepreneurship and self-employment does not require optimism, overconfidence, or any 
presence of psychological bias. Entrepreneurs can hold over-optimistic beliefs simply as a 
consequence of acting rationally on noisy yet unbiased signals of returns from vocational activity 
(Van den Steen, 2004). Whereby, those individuals who act on favorable signals from venturing 
are more likely to have observed signals with optimistic errors (Brown, 1974; Harrison & March, 
1984). Therefore, simple self-selection, based on rational choices can result in over-optimism in 
those who choose to undertake nascent activity and become entrepreneurs. Given its definition 
and measurement, over-optimism is observed in this study regardless if it is a consequence of 
cognitive bias or hubris, of simple self-selection, or of a combination of these effects. 
While there is no evidence in the extant literature of the rationality of nascent 
entrepreneurial expectations, Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988) observed that existing 
entrepreneurs reported the odds of their business “succeeding” to be significantly higher than 
historically observed and substantially better than the odds of success for other similar 
businesses. They concluded that the observed differences in expectations was likely caused by 
ex-post decision bolstering, in that once the entry into self-employment had been made, 
entrepreneurs were likely to justify this choice by believing it would lead to success. In this study 
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setting, ex-post decision bolstering can not be a cause of optimism, as the expectations observed 
are elicited before the venture is operational. 
Hypothesis 1. Nascent entrepreneurial expectations are overly-optimistic. 
 
Plans and Projections 
I argue that over-optimistic forecasts of nascent entrepreneurs’ results from the inside 
view whereby predictions are anchored on plans in which individuals have a vested interest. 
Individuals generate an inside view forecast by focusing on the case at hand, considering the plan 
and obstacles to its completion, and constructing scenarios of future progress (Kahneman & 
Lovallo, 1993: 25). The inside view, which is synonymous with the planning fallacy, draws on 
knowledge of the specifics of the case, details of the plan, and ideas about how likely obstacles 
might be overcome. The inside view represents an individual’s attempt to come to grips with the 
complexities of the unique characteristics and circumstances of the task or project. In contrast, an 
outside view is statistical and comparative in nature and does not involve any attempt to divine 
the future at any level of detail (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993: 25).  
Consistent with an inside view approach, evidence from experimental research suggests 
that people typically make forecasts by constructing a mental scenario of how the project is 
likely to develop (Buehler et al., 1994). Scenarios can be described as representations of 
temporally ordered sequences of events glued together by causal relationships (Griffin, Dunning, 
& Ross, 1990; Johnson & Sherman, 1990). The process of scenario formulation allows the 
decision maker to evaluate a given problem in a step-by-step manner by analyzing the outcome 
of a series of causal events (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). Experimental research has also shown that 
when individuals are provided with reasons or scenarios for why an outcome will be achieved, 
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their expectation of that outcome occurring increases (Hoch, 1984; Levi & Pryor, 1987). 
Buehler, Griffin, & MacDonald (1997) found that when participants were given incentives to 
complete a task, they exhibited greater optimistic bias. Further analysis revealed that the 
incentives focused participants more narrowly on their plans, consistent with the inside view. 
Consequently, the inside view tends to exacerbate tendencies of optimism and overconfidence 
that are observed in individuals’ decision making and formulation of expectations. 
The use of plans and projections by entrepreneurs is associated with scenario 
representation. For example, a formal business plan specifies the goals of the firm, and how the 
firm will achieve these goals through strategic to operational detail. Similarly, financial 
projections provide a monetary representation of the goals and expected performance of the firm. 
Business plans and financial projections emphasize the interrelationship between and among 
various activities and actions of the firm. For example, strategic goals lead to operational goals, 
which lead to specific tasks to enable goal attainment. Financial projections are a function of 
strategies and planned behavior. Further, the relevance of outside sources can be masked by 
detailed acquaintance with the specific case or by intense involvement in it (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). As more information is provided to the decision maker, such as through formal 
documents detailing scenarios of goal achievement, the individual’s propensity to employ an 
inside approach should increase, reducing the consideration given to outside sources of 
information. Consequently, the development of business plans or financial projections should 
encourage or be reflective of an inside approach to the formulation of expectations.  
While entrepreneurs can make plans or set financial targets without formally developing 
business plans or financial projections, it is undertaking these management activities that 
encourage reflection on the implementation of one’s actions, thereby making people more 
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confident in the success of the plan or the probability of achieving the targets specified (Armor & 
Taylor, 1998; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). Social psychologists suggest that people become 
more confident in their beliefs when they generate explanations for their choices and beliefs 
(Heath & Gonzalez, 1995). Further, the inside view may exacerbate other biases in decision-
making that can contribute to over-optimism. For example, when individuals focus on their own 
capabilities and actions, they may neglect the abilities and potential actions of competitors 
(Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). Additionally, individuals may anchor on the positive goals 
formulated in plans and financial projections, such as estimated revenue, and not place enough 
weight to new information, such as recent sales (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Consequently, 
the development or use of plans and scenarios by individuals with a vested interest in these 
planned behaviors is more likely to exacerbate tendencies to formulate over-optimistic 
expectations.  
An important aspect of the arguments relating the inside view to forecasting bias is the 
context and setting of the forecast. As with decision making generally, the presence of non-
rational expectations is more likely in situations of high uncertainty or complexity (Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). The tendency to rely upon singular information while neglecting base 
rate or distributional information is enhanced by the perceived uniqueness of the problem 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Consequently, the inside view arguments do not pertain to 
decisions that are routinely repeated, with the critical question being whether a particular 
problem or forecast is treated as unique, or as a problem similar to many others (Kahneman & 
Lovallo, 1993: 25). Grossly optimistic forecasts may be especially likely if the forecasts relate to 
a new technology or new type of project or otherwise places the forecaster in an unfamiliar or 
dynamic setting (Hayward et al., 2006: 164). In contrast, opportunities for learning and for 
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statistical aggregation exist when closely related problems are frequently encountered 
(Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993: 18). All of this suggests that studying nascent entrepreneurs during 
the startup stage provides a powerful setting to investigate the influence of the inside view on 
forecasting biases. 
Hypothesis 2. Nascent entrepreneurs who adopt plans and projections have 
expectations that are more overly-optimistic. 
 
METHOD 
Sample 
I used the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) to investigate the rationality 
of entrepreneurs’ expectations.3 The distinctive feature of the PSED is that it identifies and 
surveys nascent entrepreneurs in the process of starting new ventures, thereby overcoming 
potential survivorship and recall biases, such as hindsight bias, self-justification bias, and 
attribution bias, associated with surveying entrepreneurs already in business (Conway & Ross, 
1984; Golden, 1992; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). The PSED screened 64,622 individuals from the 
U.S. mainland, aged 18 or older, who were randomly selected using random-digit-dial sampling 
(Gartner et al., 2004). The screening phone interview asked if the respondent, alone or with 
others, was currently trying to start a new business. The respondents who answered yes were 
further asked if: 1) they expected to have at least some ownership in the new firm; and 2) they 
actively tried to start the new firm in the past 12 months. Those 3,592 respondents who answered 
yes to both the above questions were considered eligible for the nascent entrepreneur interview. 
                                                          
3 Research using data, questions, or research designs developed from the PSED has been published in 
numerous mainstream management and entrepreneurship based journals including: Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, Journal of Business Venturing, Journal of Management, Journal of Small Business Management, Small 
Business Economics, Strategic Management Journal, and Management Science.  
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Of those 3,592 respondents, 3,158 (87 percent) volunteered to participate in future interviews. A 
random sub-sample of 1,164 respondents was selected, contacted, and asked a further screening 
question to ensure that their current activity was considered a nascent effort rather than an infant 
business. Specifically, they were asked: “Has the start-up had a positive monthly cash flow that 
covers expenses and the owner-manager salaries for more than three months?” All respondents 
who reported that their nascent venturing activity achieved positive cash flows for more than 
three months at the time of the phone survey were removed, resulting in 830 nascent 
entrepreneurs who were subsequently phone interviewed in the first wave of the survey.4
Nascent entrepreneurs chosen for this study were chosen as those attempting to start a 
new business, but not on behalf of an employer. These two criteria ensure that the expectations 
and characteristics observed relate specifically to the respondent rather than occur as a 
consequence of undertaking entrepreneurial activities on another person’s behalf.5 Further, I 
exclude nascent activity related to the purchase or take-over of existing businesses and franchise 
or multi-level marketing initiatives. Given the focus of the research on expectations before 
business operation, I remove all respondents who reported that their nascent activity had 
achieved positive monthly cash flow at the time of the first phone interview. These additional 
criteria reduced the sample size to 592 respondents. All expectations used in this study were 
solicited from this nascent entrepreneur sample during the remainder of the first phone interview. 
                                                          
4 The rationale for adopting this definition was to be consistent with other PSED research that has 
investigated nascent venture activity. Under the PSED sampling, the achievement of positive monthly cash flows for 
more than three months was considered an infant business and not a start-up effort (Gartner et al. 2004). To examine 
the concern that including ventures that were generating revenues in the sample was spuriously affecting the 
findings I removed all start-up activity that had any revenues at the time of the first survey. The findings for the 
remaining sub-sample were the same as the full sample. 
5 A single respondent approach was used as the research focus is on expectations of individuals undertaking 
nascent activity. Given nascent activity that involves a startup team is comprised of individuals, each with an 
expectation of success that underlies their decision to be involved and remain involved in the nascent activity, the 
study findings are applicable to both individual and team based nascent activity. In 36 percent of the nascent 
ventures studied, the entire startup team consisted of a single founder.  
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Finally, I limit the sample to the 386 respondents who reported at least one expectation and 
subsequently reported the associated ex-post realization. 
An examination of potential sample bias between those who responded in future phone 
interviews and those who did not, revealed no statistically significant differences with regard to 
respondent gender, age, formal business planning, financial projections, expectations of venture 
operation, or first-year venture sales and employees.  
Variables 
Bias. Three expectations of the nascent entrepreneur were empirically examined in this 
study, namely: 1) likelihood of start-up becoming an operating business; 2) future sales in the 
first full year of operation; and 3) number of future employees, excluding owners, at the end of 
first full year of operation. To examine the expectation of the start-up becoming an operational 
business, the respondents were asked: “On a scale of zero to one hundred, what is the likelihood 
that this business will be operating five years from now, regardless of who owns and operates the 
firm?” The likelihood obtained is referred to as the nascent entrepreneurs’ expectation of 
operation. For expectations of future sales, nascent entrepreneurs were asked: “What would you 
expect the total sales, revenues, or fees to be in the first full year of operation?” While 
expectations related to fifth-year sales were also elicited, given the temporal period of the 
longitudinal survey, information regarding actual sales related to the fifth-year operations was 
not obtained by the PSED. For employment expectations, the entrepreneurs were asked: “By the 
end of the first full year of operation, about how many full-time employees, not counting owners, 
do you expect to be working for pay at this new business?”6
                                                          
6 In addition to this measure, a further employment expectation measure was calculated to incorporate 
expectations of part-time employees. This alternative expectation measure is the sum of expected full time 
employment plus half the expected part time employment. The results are invariant to the alternative expectation 
measure and consequently are not reported. 
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Entrepreneurs self-reported whether the start-up was an operating business in follow up 
phone interviews. These interviews were conducted in three waves at a mean (median) 14 (13), 
33 (32), and 56 (56) months following the initial screening interview. Respondents were asked to 
classify the current status of the start-up effort as a(n): 1) operating business; 2) active start-up; 
3) inactive start-up; and 4) no longer worked on by anyone. All those who reported the existence 
of an operating business, and who did not abandon the operating business at a future date, were 
coded as operating. All those who reported that the business was no longer worked on by anyone 
were coded as not operational unless other team members had successfully started the venture. 
Those respondents reporting active and inactive start-up activity more than five years from the 
original phone interview were classified as not operational. All remaining start-ups that were not 
operational or abandoned, and for which a phone interview was not undertaken at least 60 
months after the original phone interview, were classified as missing. Table 1 provides a 
descriptive summary of the 386 respondents’ status obtained from the follow-up phone 
interviews.7 The degree of over-optimism in venture operation was determined as the difference 
between the nascent entrepreneur’s likelihood of venture operation and an indicator variable 
(Status) that equals “1” if the venture is operational and “0” otherwise, as follows: 
Operational Over-Optimism = Expectation of Operation – Status  (1) 
------------------------------ 
 Insert Table 1 about here  
------------------------------- 
 
Sales and employment information were also obtained in the three follow-up phone 
interviews. Given that sales and employment expectations were framed on the assumption that 
                                                          
7 The findings are quantitatively similar if: 1) the 20 ventures started by other team members firms are 
excluded from the sample; 2) the operating ventures classification included the 29 ventures that operated and 
subsequently reported in future phone interviews that the business was shut down; and/or 3) a further 53 ventures 
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the venture was operational, these analyses are only undertaken for those start-ups that became 
operating businesses. For sales, entrepreneurs who were involved in a start-up that had 
completed its first full year of operation were asked what sales or revenue was achieved in the 
first full year of operation. I conducted validity checks on the timing of the ventures’ launch and 
the timing of the responses and removed cases where the responses did not represent first-year 
operations.8 For numbers of employees, entrepreneurs who were involved in a start-up that 
employed a non-owner employee were asked to provide the number of non-owner employees 
hired in full-time and part-time capacities. The degree of over-optimism, for sales and 
employment, was determined as a function of ex-ante expectations (F) and actual realizations 
(A), as follows: 
(Sales or Employment) Over-Optimism = F - A / (F + A)   (2) 
The use of deflators reduces heterogeneity in the sales and employment over-optimism 
measures obtained.9 Importantly, all measures of bias in this study, through the utilization of ex-
ante expectations in comparison with ex-post realizations, overcome the use of perceptual 
measures of expectations, such as “success,” using specific traits or characteristics to proxy for 
optimism, or inferring optimism using observed optimistic biases in other domains (Cooper et 
al., 1988; Lowe & Ziedonis, 2006; Puri & Robinson, 2005). Further, the confidential nature of 
the PSED removes gaming concerns associated with forecasts that are observable to venture 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that were active or inactive after 48 months but not phone interviewed afterwards were classified as not operational 
instead of missing. 
8 These validity checks included removing ventures that were not operational for more than one year and 
removing responses in follow-up phone interviews that related to the second-year’s, rather than first-year’s, 
operations. 
9 Other approaches to reduce heterogeneity in the forecast error included using just the ex-ante expectation 
or actual realization as the deflator and trimming, winsorizing, or log transforming the forecast error. The deflator 
utilized was chosen as the skewness and kurtosis of this measure was substantially closer to zero, which is critical 
for parametric-based testing. Notably, the study findings are invariant to alternative forecast error specifications 
discussed above. 
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stakeholders. For example, without confidentiality, entrepreneurs may upwardly bias observable 
forecasts or actual realizations to present themselves or the venture in a more favorable light to 
stakeholders or downwardly bias actual realizations to lower tax or regulatory costs. 
Entrepreneur Behavior. The behaviors empirically examined in this study are: 1) 
formal business planning; and 2) financial projections. A business plan was defined as something 
that “usually outlines the markets to be served, the products or services to be provided, the 
resources required – including money – and the expected growth and profit for the new 
business.” Formal business planning was determined to be present when nascent entrepreneurs 
responded that they had a business plan and that the current form of the plan was “formally 
prepared.” Those responding in the affirmative were coded “1” and “0” otherwise.10 The 
undertaking of financial projections was represented by a dichotomous variable (“1” yes, “0” 
otherwise) based on the question: “Have projected financial statements, such as income and cash 
flow statements or break-even analysis, been developed?”11  
Controls. The characteristics of the entrepreneur may be associated with the over-
optimism of their forecasts. For example, research has shown that males are generally more 
optimistic and more likely to overestimate future performance than females (Henry, 1994; Puri & 
Robsinon, 2005). Further, cognitive ability, knowledge, or experience of the forecasting task 
                                                          
10 Alternative definitions, such as defining business planning to represent all business plans regardless of 
whether the plan was “informally written” or “formally prepared”, or adopting a hierarchical based planning 
measure, were not utilized as the formal nature of planning is more likely to induce behavior consistent with the 
inside view (Buehler et al., 1994; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). Further, the use of dichotomous predictor variables 
or manipulations is consistent with experimental research in expectation formation and empirical research on 
business planning (Hoch, 1984; Levi & Pryor, 1984, Sedor, 2002; Delmar & Shane, 2003; Shane & Delmar, 2004).  
11 Another entrepreneurial behaviour that may be associated with over-optimism is the obtaining of market 
information by the venture team. Specifically, the PSED asked “Has an effort been made to define the market 
opportunities by talking with potential customers or getting information about the competition?” All the results were 
replicated including this independent variable, which was coded as “1” for yes and “0” otherwise. In unreported 
results, no support was found for an association between market information and over-optimism. However, very 
limited variation in this market information variable in the sample may also have resulted in a failure to find an 
association with over-optimism. 
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should reduce the error or bias in predicting future outcomes (Forbes, 2005). I control for three 
characteristics based on the demographics of the nascent entrepreneur, namely: 1) education; 2) 
gender; and 3) industry experience. Education was operationalized by a variable denoting the 
highest level of educational attainment of the respondent, being: 1) up to high school; 2) 
technical/vocational; 3) some college including associates degrees; 4) bachelors degree; and 5) 
post college. Gender was a dichotomous variable, coded as “1” for female and “0” for male. 
Industry experience is the number of years the respondent has work in the industry of the nascent 
venture.  
Several venture organizing activities were utilized to control for the stage of development 
of the nascent venture (Shane & Delmar, 2004). Venture organizing activities may be associated 
with a nascent entrepreneur’s expectations, as the more activities undertaken, the greater the 
knowledge of the venture and its viability. Further, as more activities are undertaken, the greater 
influence of selection bias in the remaining set of nascent entrepreneurs, as those nascent 
entrepreneurs that obtain confirming (disconfirming) information about the venture’s viability or 
success will be more likely to continue (disband) the nascent activity. Product development was 
determined from the response to: “at what stage of development is the product or service this 
(start-up/new firm) will be selling: 0) still in the idea stage or no work has been done on a 
product or service; 1) a model or procedure is being developed; 2) a prototype or procedure has 
been tested with customers; or 3) completed and ready for sale or delivery?”. This product 
development variable was deflated by three to provide a variable similar to the other independent 
variables which were bounded between 0 and 1.12 The extent to which the startup had begun 
                                                          
12 The decision to specify product development as an ordinal variable, rather than a series of categorical 
variables, was to constrain a monotone relationship between the extent of venture organizing activities and the 
dependent variables. In unreported results, the empirical findings were found to be quantitatively similar when 
product development was specified as a series of categorical variables.  
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marketing and promotion activities was obtained from the dichotomous response to: “Have 
marketing or promotional efforts been started (for the product or service this (startup/new firm) 
will be selling)?” A yes response was coded “1” and “0” otherwise. The extent to which the 
startup had begun to obtain raw inputs was solicited from: “Have any raw materials, inventory, 
supplies, or components for the new (start-up/business) been purchased?” A yes response was 
coded “1” and “0” otherwise. The extent to which the startup had begun to obtain capital inputs 
was solicited from: “Have any major items ($1000 or more) like equipment, facilities, or 
property been purchased, leased, or rented for the new (start-up/business)?” Again, a yes 
response was coded “1” and “0” otherwise. In addition, a variable representing whether the 
startup had received revenue was solicited from: “Has the new business received any money, 
income, or fees from the sale of goods or services?” Those that had received revenue were coded 
“1”, otherwise “0”. 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations of the study variables. 
Examining the descriptive statistics reveals substantial over-optimism in nascent entrepreneurs. 
First, significant over-optimism is observed in the nascent entrepreneurs’ expectations of venture 
operation. At the mean (median), nascent entrepreneurs believe there is an 81.0 percent (90 
percent) chance that their nascent activity will result in an operating venture; however, only 47.8 
percent of ventures actually achieve operation, resulting in a mean bias in the expectations of 
venture operation of 33.2 percent (t = 12.33, p < .0001).13 14 Second, of those that achieved 
                                                          
13 While substantial optimistic bias was observed, the expectation of operation and the eventual status of 
the venture was significantly positively correlated in the sample (ρ = 0.14, p < .01). Therefore, those individuals that 
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operation and had available first-year sales information, significant overestimation of projected 
sales is observed, with 62 percent overestimating first-year sales as opposed to 34 percent 
underestimating sales, resulting in a mean (median) sales over-optimism of 0.17 (0.25). Third, 
employment expectations were also overly optimistic, with 46 percent overestimating 
employment after one year of operations as opposed to 28 percent underestimating employment. 
Overall, the evidence presented is consistent with nascent entrepreneurs being overly-optimistic, 
and therefore supports hypothesis one. 
------------------------------ 
 Insert Table 2 about here  
------------------------------- 
 
Cross-Sectional Differences in Optimistic Bias 
Table 3 reports a series of regressions reporting cross-sectional differences in 
expectations of venture operation and operating optimism. Given the bounds on the dependent 
variables, the assumptions that underlie the error distributions of ordinary least squares are not 
appropriate: consequently, I use generalized method of moments (GMM).15 For descriptive 
purposes, the first three columns report the coefficients from models predicting the expectations 
of operation by nascent entrepreneurs. These regressions are analogous to empirical research that 
has examined entrepreneurial expectations without considering ex-post outcomes. Reporting 
both the nascent entrepreneurs’ likelihood of success and the bias associated with their 
expectations allows comparison between those behaviors or attributes that are associated with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
predicted their nascent activity would become an operating venture were more likely to become operating ventures, 
suggesting that respondents, while biased, were careful when providing operational expectations for their startups. 
14 Significant over-optimistic expectations (p < 0.05) are observed for all major SIC divisions with greater 
than 15 observations. 
15 Regression techniques that incorporate censored dependent variables, such as tobit regression, are not 
appropriate, as the assumptions of self-selection and censorship that underlie these models are not present for the 
dependent variables investigated in this study (Maddala, 1993; Wooldridge, 2003: 553).  
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positive expectations and those that are associated with overly-optimistic expectations. Requiring 
non-missing values for all independent variables reduced the analysis to 368 observations. The 
coefficient on formal business planning is 8.42 (p < .001), suggesting that undertaking this 
activity significantly increases the nascent entrepreneur’s expectation of operation by 8.42 
percent. However, whether formal planning is associated with optimism is determinant on how 
planning is associated with subsequent venture operation.  
Examining cross-sectional variations in operational over-optimism reveals that the 
coefficient on formal business planning for observed over-optimism is consistently negative and 
insignificant. Therefore, while formal business plan preparation increases the expectation that the 
venturing activity will lead to an operating venture, such preparation is not associated with 
overly optimistic expectations, as planning is also positively associated with the likelihood that 
the nascent activity will become an operating venture. The coefficients on capital inputs and 
money received is negative, suggesting that individuals whose nascent activities have purchased 
significant capital inputs for the venture or who have received money have a lower bias in their 
expectations of venture operation than those who do not. However, while this bias is lower, 
individuals that have undertaken these activities still appear to exhibit optimism. Overall, the 
evidence presented for operational over-optimism does not support hypothesis two. 
------------------------------ 
 Insert Table 3 about here  
------------------------------- 
 
Table 4 presents the GMM regression analysis for those ventures that achieved operation 
for one year or more. Given the relatively small number of observations available for both sales 
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and employment, formal business planning and financial projections are included in separate 
models to avoid harmful multicollinearity (Kennedy, 2003).16  
Model 1 shows that formal business planning is not associated with sales optimism. 
However, in model 2, it is observed that the preparation of projected financial statements leads to 
more optimistic forecasts in regard to venture sales (p < .01). This result is consistent with the 
inside view causing over-optimism in expectations. In particular, the undertaking of financial 
projections encourages the nascent entrepreneur to adopt an inside view in regard to the financial 
performance of the venture, resulting in overly-optimistic financial expectations. This result is 
consistent with hypothesis two. Further, the above association is invariant to the inclusion of 
venture organizing activities in the full model presented in column three. The results from model 
3 also show that nascent entrepreneurs whose ventures have received money from the sales of 
goods or services have significantly less over-optimism in their sales expectations. This 
demonstrates the benefit of actually making sales in improving the rationality of financial sales 
expectations.17
Interestingly, for employment over-optimism, the relationship between optimism and 
financial projections is no longer found, with the coefficients on models 5 and 6 actually being 
negative and insignificant. An explanation for the difference between sales and employment is 
                                                          
16 The condition index is advocated to be the best indicator of multicollinearity and is calculated as the 
square root of the ratio of the largest to the smallest characteristic root of X´X (Belsley 1991; Kennedy 2003). The 
condition index on the full models presented in Table 4 with the inclusion of both formal business planning and 
financial projections was above 25, which is suggestive of harmful collinearity (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). An 
explanation for the greater collinearity observed in these models, beyond the reduction in sample size, is the stronger 
correlation between formal business planning and financial projections for the sub-sample of ventures that achieved 
operation for one year or more. 
17 To investigate the possibility that reported over-optimism in sales was driven by pressure placed on 
entrepreneurs by investors to facilitate investment both the sales expectations and over-optimism of sales were 
compared for those who had asked financial institutions and other people for funding and those who have not. There 
were no significant differences between these two groups (t = 1.02, p = 0.31) and (t = 0.32, p = 0.75), suggesting 
that this concern was not driving the presence of over-optimism. It should also be noted that given the survey is 
confidential there should be no incentive on the entrepreneur to artificially inflate their reported expectation to 
satisfy outside stakeholders. 
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that financial projections are the monetary representation of the financial outcomes of intended 
behavior. Therefore, the nexus between sales and financial outcomes is more direct than the 
nexus between employment and financial outcomes. For example, additional employment may 
be associated with increased scale, which may represent larger financial returns, but it may also 
bring increased costs, which are associated with lower financial returns to the entrepreneur. In 
comparison, sales are specifically modeled in financial projections, and greater sales are directly 
associated with positive outcomes for the entrepreneur. Therefore, even though both sales and 
employment expectations were highly positively correlated in the sample (ρ = .49, p < .001), the 
undertaking of financial projections has different implications for the beliefs of nascent 
entrepreneurs in regard to sales and employment. 
------------------------------ 
 Insert Table 4 about here  
------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION 
Implications for Theory and Practice 
The study findings are of interest for several reasons. First, it is the first study to provide 
longitudinal evidence of the rationality of individuals’ expectations during the venture evaluation 
process. The advantage of the longitudinal approach is that it elicits expectations of nascent 
entrepreneurs and compares them to observed outcomes, thereby overcoming methodological 
concerns of extant research evaluating the expectations of decision makers. Extant research has 
demonstrated that individuals who are optimistic about their life expectancy or those that have 
higher self-efficacy are more likely to be an entrepreneur than in career employment (Puri & 
Robinson, 2005; Zhao, Seibert, & Hills, 2005). Similarly, extant research has found that 
individuals who are overconfident in the certainty of their knowledge, in that they overestimate 
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the correctness or precision of their beliefs in answering challenging questions or predicting the 
future, are more likely to be entrepreneurs and more likely to undertake product introductions 
that are pioneering or risky (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Forbes, 2005; Simon & Houghton, 2003). 
However, these research approaches cannot answer whether individuals entering venturing are 
overly-optimistic in regard to the venturing activities they undertake, as this can only be 
achieved through comparing ex-ante expectations with ex-post outcomes. By providing specific 
evidence demonstrating that individuals entering venturing overestimate the benefits from 
undertaking nascent activity and subsequent entrepreneurship, this research contributes to the 
literature that seeks understanding of the forces that underlie entry into and persistence of 
entrepreneurial behavior.  
Cooper et al. (1988) observed that individuals who recently became entrepreneurs 
reported their odds of business success to be substantially higher than historically observed and 
greater than the odds of success for other similar businesses. Given their research design, the 
authors posited that these beliefs were caused by post-decisional bolstering. In the current study 
setting, ex-post decision bolstering cannot be a cause of optimism, as the expectations observed 
are elicited before the venture is operational. The evidence from this study cannot confirm or 
reject that bias related to ex-post decision bolstering is present in entrepreneurs; however, it does 
suggest that the presence of optimistic beliefs in entrepreneurs is not contingent on the presence 
of ex-post decision bolstering. 
Second, this study contributes to theory by being the first study to empirically investigate 
how the inside view can affect expectations in a field setting. While there is evidence of the 
presence of such views in forecasting behavior within a population generally, little research has 
investigated cross-sectional differences of inside view adoption and forecasting biases within 
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sample (Buehler et al., 1994). For example, while researchers conjecture that individuals are 
generally too optimistic, it is unclear whether those who adopt a more inside view to forecasting 
are more likely to have forecasting biases. Consequently, we have little understanding of cross-
sectional differences in forecasting rationality for individuals in similar settings. Further, there is 
a lack of understanding about how the inside view influences expectations and beliefs in field 
settings, with the limited evidence related to the inside view based on experimental settings. By 
using a field design, I address concerns that experimental designs may overstate the presence of 
bias in decision making, given their reliance on salient signals, lack of meaningful incentives, or 
insufficient task orientation (Schwarz, 1994). This study demonstrates that differences in 
management behaviors consistent with the inside view appear to be an economically significant 
influence on expectation formation and contribute to understanding cross-sectional differences in 
forecast optimism in the field.  
Further, distinguishing between different types of expectations revealed that financial 
projections, while being associated with overly-optimistic sales expectations, were not associated 
with overly-optimistic employment expectations. Such a finding is analogous with the 
compatibility principle, which has been observed in experimental settings, whereby the weight of 
any input component is enhanced by its compatibility with the output. For example, when 
subjects were asked to provide a numerical output, such as a dollar amount, numerical data had a 
greater impact on their response than other data that was less compatible in content, scale, or 
display (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). As financial projections are the monetary 
representation of the outcomes of intended behavior, they should be more likely to encourage 
reflection on the causal events that lead to the financial outcomes. Further, employment 
outcomes are more ambiguous in regard to the financial performance of a venture than are sales 
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outcomes. For example, greater sales and growth may lead to greater need for the venture to 
employ more people; however, more employees also represent greater costs, thereby reducing 
the financial returns from the venture. In other words, the undertaking of financial projections is 
associated with overly-optimistic expectations for financial outcomes, but not necessarily for 
other outcomes. The varying implications for the expectations of decision makers from different 
management behaviors highlights the importance of the context of the inside view and the types 
of plans and projections used in shaping expectations. 
Third, the study provides empirical evidence for cross-sectional differences in forecast 
optimism distinguishing between ex-ante beliefs and ex-post outcomes. In particular, the 
evidence suggests that formal business planning by the nascent entrepreneur, while being 
associated with a greater likelihood that their nascent activity would lead to an operating venture, 
is not associated with overly-optimistic beliefs. The explanation for this finding is that formal 
business planning facilitates venture formation, increasing the likelihood of entrepreneurs 
completing the tasks required to progress their nascent activity into an operating business. The 
specific mechanism that planning facilitates organizational creation may be through focusing 
goal attainment and allowing individuals to make faster decisions than with trail-and-error 
learning (Delmar and Shane, 2003). Alternatively, regardless of the specific strategies and goals 
set, the presence of a formal plan may stimulate structure to animate and orientate individuals act 
with more intensity (Weick, 1995). This finding also demonstrates the importance of longitudinal 
designs to distinguish between those behaviors or attributes that are associated with positive 
expectations from those that are associated with unjustified or overly-optimistic expectations.  
More generally, the study findings are of interest to decision makers. While research has 
examined the forecast accuracy of decision makers, there is limited understanding of how 
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particular behaviors influence forecasting bias (Durand, 2003). For example, there is little 
evidence on whether commonly used management practices moderate the level of optimistic or 
extreme prediction. Consequently, this study provides an important link between observed 
psychological bias and management practices, namely financial projections. This documented 
relationship is particularly important, given the fundamental role that financial projections play 
in allowing decision makers to structure expectations and cope with the future. The evidence 
from this study suggests that the same management activities that entrepreneurs rely on to cope 
with uncertainty appear to be causing individuals to hold optimistic expectations. 
Acknowledging how management practices bias expectations may allow decision makers to use 
organizational or decision-making controls to reduce this influence. For example, generating 
reasons why the planned outcome may not be achieved or consciously relating past experiences 
to the forecasting task at hand are approaches individuals can take to reduce overly-optimistic or 
overconfident forecasts (Buehler et al., 1994; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). In a 
group setting, the use of conflict-based approaches, whereby members critique proposals and 
make counter arguments may result in more realistic expectations (Schweiger, Sandberg, & 
Ragan, 1986).  
Another decision-making de-biasing technique is adoption of the outside view. Through 
incorporating relevant information that decision-makers may otherwise neglect, the outside view 
should avoid the over-optimistic tendencies from scenario thinking (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Specifically, with knowledge of the outcomes from similar 
previous endeavors, decision-makers’ expectations can be formed through evaluation of how 
their present endeavor compares to previous endeavors. Within this evaluation, decision-makers 
should also de-bias their expectations by factoring out historically observed forecasting errors 
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made by similar endeavors and control for over-optimistic tendencies when comparing their 
endeavor’s future performance to previous similar endeavors (Flyvbjerg, 2004; Lovallo & 
Kahneman, 2003). Therefore, this study also has implications for nascent entrepreneurs, as the 
findings demonstrate a general forecasting bias in those entering venturing. An awareness of the 
biased forecasting tendencies of those in similar decision-making settings may allow individuals 
considering future entrepreneurial activity to incorporate knowledge of bias into future 
expectations. However, the benefits of awareness may be tempered by the tendency for decision 
makers to ignore such warnings depending on the perceived uniqueness of their venture 
opportunity.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The study’s focus on individuals undertaking nascent venture activity is a powerful 
setting in which the inside view tendencies are heightened, given the uniqueness of the 
forecasting task and the vested interest of the forecaster. Future research should investigate the 
extent to which inside view adoption, and the use of management practices associated with the 
inside view, affects the expectations of decision makers in settings beyond nascent venturing 
activity. For example, in an organizational setting, the use of groups and the extent to which 
organizational controls are in place to reduce optimistic bias or provide forecasting discipline 
may reduce or exacerbate decision makers’ optimistic bias on the expectations of decision 
makers (McNamara & Bromiley, 1997). Variations in the nature of the forecasting task, such as 
the degree to which a forecast is unique or recurrent, and the degree to which the forecaster has a 
vested interest in the prediction or outcome may all influence both forecasting bias and the 
influence of management behavior on forecasting bias. Such empirical investigations of the 
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inside view may provide insight by testing the bounds of theory to which the inside view is 
posited to influence expectations or exacerbate boldness in forecasting. 
Many financial intermediaries require ventures to submit financial projections in order to 
be eligible for financing. Such behavior is considered good business practice and not only 
provides potential financiers with information concerning the investment project, but also signals 
the competence and quality of the management team. The empirical findings show that the act of 
preparing financial statements is associated with more optimistically biased sales projections. 
Clearly, financial intermediaries and other stakeholders can undo any bias by the preparers 
through due diligence or superior knowledge (Cable & Shane, 1997). To what extent outside 
stakeholders are susceptible to potential biases in decision making is an interesting question for 
future research. For example, how does financier confidence and optimism change as a result of 
an entrepreneur’s submission of formal business plans or financial projections, or direct 
discussions with entrepreneurs? Experimental evidence from other groups, such as venture 
capitalists and financial analysts, suggests that they too are susceptible to simple manipulations 
in the format of information, consistent with scenario thinking (Sedor, 2002; Zacharakis & 
Shepherd, 2001). 
While the findings presented here demonstrate that nascent entrepreneurs are overly 
optimistic, it is important to recognize that the population investigated in this study is distinct 
from those considered to be existing owners and managers of firms. Extant evidence regarding 
the presence of over-optimistic beliefs in entrepreneurs and managers in established firms, which 
has utilized a longitudinal design comparing ex-ante expectations with ex-post realizations, has 
been limited and inconclusive (Ashworth, Johnson, & Conway, 1998; Cassar & Gibson, 2007). 
Differences between nascent entrepreneurs and other decision makers may be a consequence of 
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differences in ability, forecasting process, and variations in the nature of forecasting undertaken. 
The extent to which entrepreneurs learn about their venture opportunity during the operation of 
the firm through feedback and the learning achieved from venturing experience that may 
improve their evaluations of expectations related to future nascent activity could be determined 
with longer time-series data beyond the scope of the PSED. These important questions are left to 
future research. 
The empirical analyses in regard to over-optimism in one-year sales and employment 
expectations were achieved with a relatively small sample, primarily because only those nascent 
entrepreneurs that subsequently achieved an operating venture, were interviewed, and completed 
the realizations after one year’s operation were available for comparison. The attrition resulting 
from the low proportion of nascent ventures that become operating ventures and the longitudinal 
nature of data collection can be addressed in future research by starting with a greater number of 
respondents in the first stage of data collection. Importantly, even given the relatively small 
sample, the association between financial projections and over-optimistic financial expectations 
was observed. 
Conclusion 
This research examines the rationality of the expectations of nascent entrepreneurs during 
new venture start-up. Consistent with conjectures regarding entrepreneur entry, this study finds 
substantial over-optimism in expectations, in that nascent entrepreneurs overestimate the 
probability of their nascent activity becoming an operating venture. Further, nascent 
entrepreneurs overestimate future one-year sales and employment of the venture, suggesting that 
they are overly-optimistic both in regard to the success of their venturing activity and the actual 
performance of their operating ventures. 
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Additionally, this study demonstrates important linkages between the psychological 
biases present in nascent entrepreneurs’ forecasts and their use of typical management activities. 
The adoption of plans and scenarios, in particular financial projections, significantly exacerbates 
tendencies for individuals to make financial forecasts that are too optimistic. This suggests that 
the same management activities that are advocated by academics and adopted by individuals to 
cope with the future are associated with nascent entrepreneurs having irrational expectations. 
Given the importance of organizational creation and venture growth, and the expectations that 
underlie them, the findings from this study have important implications for both theory and 
practice.  
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TABLE 1 
Future Status of Nascent Venture Activity 
Future Status Description Status n 
Not operating business after 60 months Not Operating 4  
Given up on start activity Not Operating 168  
Business was shut down before 60 months Not Operating 29  
Team members operating business that was given up by respondent Operating 20  
Operating business at last phone interview Operating 165  
Total  386  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlationsa
Variables n Mean s.d. Median 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Operational over-optimism 385 33.17** 52.78 10.00**  
2. Sales over-optimism 50 0.17* 0.53 0.25* .20            
3. Employment over-optimism 46 0.15† 0.57 0.00 -.22 .49*           
4. Formal business planning 380 0.16 0.37 0.00 -.02 .03 -.13          
5. Financial projections 385 0.33 0.47 0.00 -.03 .37** -.21 .38         
6. Education 386 3.22 1.28 3.00 -.07 .04 -.15 .06 .08        
7. Gender 386 0.51 0.50 1.00 .05 -.12 .03 -.13 * -.17** .05       
8. Industry experience 386 9.18 10.34 5.00 -.05 -.01 .31* .16 ** .03 .06 -.10†      
9. Product development 376 0.63 0.38 0.67 -.13* -.17 -.08 .05 .05 .03 .01 .09†     
10. Promotion 386 0.57 0.50 1.00 -.13* -.00 .03 .11 * .15 .06 -.05 .07 .40**    
11. Raw inputs 386 0.73 0.45 1.00 -.11 -.05 -.11 -.01 .12 -.01 .07 .00 .34** .36**   
12. Capital inputs 386 0.53 0.50 1.00 -.15** .09 .20 .01 .12 -.05 -.08 .07 .23** .23** .35**  
13. Money received 386 0.41 0.49 0.00 -.18** -.21 -.01 .07 .07 .03 .05 .08 .44** .38** .29** .35** 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
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TABLE 3 
Results of GMM Regression Analysis of Operational Expectations and Over-Optimism a
 Expectation of Operation  Operational Over-Optimism 
Variables Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Intercept 79.40*** (1.65)  82.42*** (5.05)  81.42*** (5.10)  34.13*** (3.50)  58.27*** (10.24)  58.11 ***(10.34)
Formal business planning 9.90*** (2.85)     8.42** (2.91)  -1.48 (7.40)     0.97 (7.40)
Financial projections -0.44 (2.91)     0.11 (3.11)  -4.60 (6.07)     0.22 (6.10)
                  
Education    -2.68* (1.12)  -2.75* (1.14)     -3.01 (2.19)  -3.03 (2.22)
Gender    1.66 (2.59)  2.45 (2.69)     6.22 (5.60)  6.34 (5.70)
Industry experience    0.25* (0.11)  0.20† (0.11)     -0.19 (0.26)  -0.19 (0.27)
Product development    2.63 (3.93)  2.69 (3.92)     -1.39 (8.67)  -1.37 (8.73)
Promotion    5.55 (3.03)  5.00 (3.03)     -3.69 (6.52)  -3.78 (6.57)
Raw inputs    -2.04 (3.14)  -1.78 (3.16)     -4.28 (7.20)  -4.27 (7.28)
Capital inputs    -0.37 (2.98)  -0.12 (2.99)     -10.27† (6.16)  -10.25 (6.22)
Money received    1.93 (2.93)  1.48 (2.93)     -14.28* (6.41)  -14.33* (6.45)
                  
Wald χ2 14.63**   18.17*   31.99***   0.81   27.35***   27.37***  
R2 0.02   0.05   0.06   0.00   0.06   0.06  
n 368   368   368   368   368   368  
 a Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
      † p < .10 
      * p < .05 
    ** p < .01 
  *** p < .001, two tailed tests 
.
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TABLE 4 
Results of GMM Regression Analysis of One-Year Sales and Employment Over-Optimism a
 Sales Over-Optimism  Employment Over-Optimism 
Variables Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Intercept 0.16† (0.08)  0.00 (0.09)  0.21 (0.33)  0.21 (0.12)  0.26 (0.12)  0.00 (0.52)
Formal business planning 0.04 (0.18)        -0.15 (0.16)       
Financial projections    0.40** (0.14)  0.44* (0.18)     -0.23 (0.16)  -0.20 (0.16)
                  
Education       -0.03 (0.07)        0.00 (0.08)
Gender       0.00 (0.16)        -0.03 (0.17)
Industry experience       -0.00 (0.01)        0.01 (0.01)
Product development       -0.14 (0.27)        -0.14 (0.40)
Promotion       0.12 (0.15)        0.07 (0.25)
Raw inputs       -0.01 (0.22)        -0.14 (0.32)
Capital inputs       0.15 (0.24)        0.41† (0.23)
Money received       -0.30† (0.16)        -0.10 (0.18)
                  
Wald χ2 0.04   7.88**   23.79**   0.85   1.99   12.99  
R2 0.00   0.14   0.24   0.02   0.04   0.23  
n 50   50   50   46   46   46  
 a Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
      † p < .10 
      * p < .05 
    ** p < .01 
  *** p < .001, two tailed tests. 
 
 
